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well as faith and charity, and give him not only one opportunity but many to reinstate himself. Peter should be a great comfort to all of us, because he proved how repentance and trust can redeem the man. Two months after he had denied Christ thrice he stood on the temple steps and proclaimed him to the world. But we can hardly look for a quick Peter-like conversion in our faithless friend ; there is not the merit in us to create it ; let us then give him time, give him all the time there is, which is eternity, and in some part of it our trust will be justified.

Strome's friend gave utterance to an expression of the purest unselfishness and his cry is echoed down the ages. "Would I had died for thee, Absalom, my son !" And this is what the son of man and of God did. Vicarious life is the moving power of the universe. In God the personal and universal are united. "The strangest fact in the history of the world," says Prof. Davidson, "is the extraordinary personal love that Jesus excited in those who came in contact with him. They felt that in loving him they were loving the infinite God." This personal love was the center from which the vast circumference of Christianity, with its immeasurable superiority to all other developments in religion or culture, drew its life, and will forever. Man and God have become friends. We need not be servants unless we choose, though those "who will not ride in his chariot must drag in his chains." But we are offered the divine prerogative of friendship, and "so great a thing as friendship let us carry with what grandeur of soul we may."

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## ARISTOTLE'S DOCTRINE OF REASON.

BY W. T. HARRIS.

There are two points of view from which the human mind may contemplate the world. The first is the view of the world from the standpoint of sense-perception ; the second, the view from the standpoint of the Reason or speculative insight. Sense-perception views the world as a congeries of particular things, each one an independent existence having its own being by itself, apart

from the rest of the universe and in complete repose so far as its essence is concerned. All its relations to other beings are accidental and do not concern its essence. All its activities—movements, changes—too, are accidental, and do not affect its essential nature.

Such a view of the world is properly called *materialistic*. It looks upon the real and substantial as matter which fills space and is composed of hard particles, each excluding the others. Each material particle is an atom, or composed of atoms. These atoms are unchangeable and devoid of motion within themselves. This is the theory made to fit sense-perception. Sense-perception does not form a theory for itself of the universe, but reflection discovers the atomic theory as adapted to this sense-view of the world.

The reason in its view of the world, on the other hand, takes its stand on the theory of self-activity as the truly existent. According to it each thing in the universe is either a self-activity or dependent on a self-activity for all its qualities and attributes—all its properties and manifestations.

Thus our two views of the world stand in contrast. The sense-view supposes the essential to be quiescent matter without movement except what it receives from outside itself. The reason-view holds the theory that essence is self-activity, and that all quiescent matter or material things are phenomenal. By phenomenal it means dependent being—not self-contained and essential, but only the manifestation of an essence which is self-active.

To the sense-point of view nothing seems so absurd as the theory that makes self-activity the basis of existence. To the reason it is utterly impossible to hold any other theory than that of a self-active basis for phenomena. Sense-perception does not see the necessity for self-activity; in fact, it regards self-activity as inconceivable. Our minds can imagine a *thing*—a quiescent being, a form, a shape, but how can we imagine or envisage an activity—a self-activity? Sense-perception knows things, and things only. But reason knows things too, and it explains them through self-activity. Sense-perception explains things through things—great things through little things or particles of matter, and little things through less things; and all things through least things or material atoms. Thus, to sense-perception, the important category or principle of explanation is composition or combination. Analysis and

synthesis explain the composition of each thing out of other things. But composition is an activity ; it implies change and motion. How do things get compounded—how does composition happen ? On this topic sense-perception has not reflected. It has no theory of composition or decomposition, nor of any sort of activity in short ; for it cannot image or picture an activity, and therefore ignores it altogether, or what is the same thing, refers it to the category of accident or chance : “ Things happen to get composed or joined together.”

From the fact that sense-perception regards *things* as the only essential beings and neglects activity, it explains all movement and change as something which has an external origin to the thing. Things get moved by the action of other things. The explanation of the movement of any one thing is thus avoided : “ This thing moves because other things have impinged upon it and caused it to move.” But why did those things impinge upon this thing ? Why did they move and cause it to move ? They moved, replies sense-perception, because other things impinged upon them and caused them to move, and still other things moved and caused those things to move. And so the origin of motion is pushed off *ad infinitum* ; it is always from beyond the things.

It would seem as though sense-perception had a vague notion that the question of the *whence* of motion would somehow settle itself if it could be pushed off or postponed from present consideration. It says in effect : this thing is not the origin of motion ; nor is that thing, nor any other thing. All motion that we see in things is derivative : “ it cometh from afar.” It is not derived from things. Sense-perception by this admission has brought itself into a dilemma. For it attempted to explain the world by matter—by great things and little things—by masses and molecules. But it was obliged to use the category of composition and decomposition, a category of activity and not of matter. All the differences in the universe arise from composition and decomposition ; all the appearances, all the phenomena, all the things, in short, take on their present forms through this kind of activity known to sense-perception as composition and decomposition. Hence it would seem that activity is the essential principle of explanation after all. Take away composition and you have left only atoms. But atoms are invisible. We cannot see or perceive

them except in the vast aggregates which compose things. Visibility is then the effect of activity or composition. Inasmuch as atoms are invisible they are mere fictions of thought set up by theory in order to explain sense-perception.

Sense-perception explains things by composition, and ultimate things should be fixed elements or atoms. The dilemma into which this theory has run is this: all of reality should be in the form of ultimate things; but in point of fact all of reality perceptible by the senses is a result of activity. Because activity is the origin of visible form. The senses perceive only forms and shapes, but never perceive the forms and shapes of the ultimate elements. All objects of sense-perception are then perceptible only in so far as they are products of activity. Hence it is evident that the one essential problem before the common sense of the world is to explain composition and decomposition, motion and change, activity and passivity. But this problem it has avoided and ignored. It has acted like the ostrich when pursued by the hunters: it has hidden its head in the sands (atoms) in order to avoid the pursuing questions regarding composition and activity. It has ignored the question of origin of motion, but in doing so it has been obliged to deny its origin in things. All motion comes to things from without and there is no origination of motion on the part of things. If sense-perception or reflection said anything else than this—if it admitted, for example, that motion could originate in a thing, it would admit self-activity.

Reason sees this dilemma, and sees moreover that there is no escape from the admission of self-activity. Its reasoning is this:

(a) Shapes and forms, positions and relations, composition and decomposition, arise by movement and change.

(b) Change is either derived from some external source, or else it originates in self-activity within.

(c) But if it originates from some external source there must be self-activity in that external source. If it is asserted that the external source also receives its change from some other external source, reason replies effectively thus:

(d) Let this thing and all external things be devoid of self-activity; let each thing in the universe be moved only by external causes, and it follows that all things are derivative and dependent on motion which comes from without; it follows then that motion

originates in itself ; or if it does not originate, but is self-existent, then of course its influence on things (producing composition and decomposition in them) is only the manifestation of motion as self-activity or essential energy. Motion, or the source of motion, existing apart from things, eternally giving rise to formation and transformation—causing worlds to aggregate and mineral strata to deposit ; floods to disintegrate and frosts to fix ; plants to grow ; animals to manifest selfhood ; races of men to seek to explain the world and themselves—such source of such motion is self-activity. The world shows a gradation from mere mechanism or the movement of composition and decomposition which manifests the action of external forces only, up to life in which movement arises as the manifestation of will-power energizing to accomplish an inward purpose or design.

Looking at the world then with the reason we see two orders of beings, a lowest and a highest, connected by intermediate orders participating in both. First there are mechanical beings—helpless and unconscious—impelled from without ; aggregated and disintegrated by external forces : the lowest form of being in the world, being that cannot determine its own form, but takes it as an impress from some other being. From mechanical being reason looks up along the line of progress and sees beings that possess some power of determining their own form ; at the summit of the world it sees man, gifted with the power of perfect self-determination. I say the *power* of perfect self-determination, and not the *full realization* of perfect self-determination. For man has the *power* to transform any *thing, fact, or event*, or any idea of his mind, and hence is responsible for them all. If it is already perfect he can make it imperfect ; if imperfect he can make it perfect ; or he can by his self activity approximate perfection or imperfection. But he is not, as historic individual, already perfect.

Reason sees that the essence or essential being of the world must be not a thing or a being devoid of activity, but a self-activity. It recognizes in a man a being in whom is realized this self-activity as an energy or power, but not as a completely self-realized being.

Thus there are possible two forms of self-activity : first, self-activity as the *power* to realize itself ; second, the self-activity that has completely accomplished this self-realization.

Now the insight of reason sees the necessity of self-activity as presupposed by all existence and change in the world. But what self-activity? The first or second form of self-activity—the complete self-realization or the *power* to realize itself? Certainly the former, the completed self-realization, is presupposed by a world of incomplete beings involved in a process of realization. Certainly a being must realize itself before it can realize others. A World-Reason therefore that furnishes the self-activity necessary to a universe of dependent and derivative beings must be a completed self-realization. Only a finite time can separate a being from the perfection toward which it is growing or developing and for which it possesses capacity. But time does not and cannot condition the growth of the universe. It must be as complete at one time as at another. The absolute is unconditioned as to time. Time past is greater than any given time, and hence more than sufficient for any possible development that was in progress. As a whole the universe is complete or perfect, and always has been. Any development or progress that we see now—any self-activities that we may now trace out in a stage of becoming or development, prove therefore that there is perennial renewal or new creation of beings that possess the capacity of growth.

Returning to our comparison between sense-perception and reason, we may now affirm that the latter is theistic while the former is atheistic.

Moreover, it is not a question of mere arbitrary choice which view one will take of the world. The theory of reason is the necessary view to the mature and logical thinker. The atomic view of sense-perception is possible only to persons of immature logical development, and although the number of persons who have traversed the logical steps and seen the connection may be said to be few in any age, yet the passage is open to each and every one, and has been open to them since its first exploration by Plato and Aristotle more than twenty-two centuries ago.

Sense-perception explains by ignoring all activity, and thus by omitting all that needs explanation. Reason explains through tracing activity of every sort to its necessary presupposition, self-activity, and identifying self-activity first as life or secondly as mind.

Religion, indeed, long before, had reached the true secret of

the universe, and made divine reason the burden of its revelation. Philosophy reached this result with Plato. In the form of religion the doctrine becomes the professed faith of the world, but as a philosophic insight it remains the possession of a few—of those few who will do the necessary thinking and go through the mental purification necessary to remove the images of sense that at first obscure the mental vision. In religion the doctrine remains a mystery which is believed, thought not understood. But, in theology, it is expounded by the aid of Philosophy. But without divesting one's self of the form of sense-perception, one does not get to the true view, although one may learn the word-formula that expresses it. It is not edifying to see divine things spoken of as though they were matters of the sensuous world-order. And yet though the piety of the intellect may be wanting, and there be no insight into the eternal verities, there may be self-sacrifice and an immaterial basis for practical life adopted, and the forms of ethical conduct assumed which are based on the spiritual view of the world. Nay, more; in the perpetual worship of a Personal First Cause the mind may come to place a true estimate on the things of sense in comparison with things divine.

Between this view of the reason and that of sense-perception there is a middle realm of transition.

When reflection commences, the mind begins to depart from the standpoint of sense which regards all beings as possessing independent validity. Reflection discovers relations and dependences. It learns the derivation of one being from another. At first it strives to retain the world-view of sense by adopting the atomic theory and using the categories of *composition* and *decomposition*. But it gradually lays these aside and adopts the category of *force* or energy. Even with this idea it tries to keep near the sense-point of view, at first, by ignoring the essential thought of force and calling it a "mode of motion," for it is evident that energy is not an object of the senses but an object of thought. It is indeed a very deep thought. Energy or force contains two ideas that form a sharp contrast, and yet it unites them in one. There is, in force, the idea of an inner being that manifests itself on an external environment. Internally one, it is externally multiplex; force unites these ideas of identity and diversity. Hence force is a category for the explanation of becoming, transition, development,

growth, evolution. The attempt to ignore the idea of energy or causal power in force, and to retain only a "mode of motion" is well enough for the purposes of investigating objects by the methods of natural science, but for purposes of real thinking in science or in philosophy it has never been consistently carried out. The category is too potent for the thinker: He finds himself slipping down into the idea of energy and efficient causality in spite of himself. Mode of motion is merely the fact to which he adds the idea of force in order to interpret it. Causality was explained by Hume's disciples as "invariable sequence"; force is now explained in like manner by "mode of motion." As soon as one begins to deal with essential relations between things—and by "essential relation" one means dependence of one thing on another, or the derivation of one thing from another—he begins to use the true ideas of cause and force.

Here we have an insight into the progress of natural science. Its first stage lays great stress on obtaining a mere inventory of nature; but the second stage investigates essential relations. Isaac Newton holds his high place in the esteem of men because he inaugurated this second species of science and connected all bodies of the universe near and far off by the essential relation of a gravitating force. Every particle of matter in its weight manifests the attractive force of all other matter in space. Science in its second stage passes beyond mere inventorying, and studies nature in its history. It studies each thing in its essential relations, and tries to discover its exact place in a connected series of evolution. The total evolution of an object is the history of the action of its energy.

Psychology has given a name to this mediating faculty of the mind that lies midway between Reason, which sees first principles, and sense, which sees immediate things and facts. It is called by German psychology *Verstand*, that is to say, the *understanding*. Aristotle calls it *διάνοια* (*dianoia*)—or discursive reason—*discursive* because it passes by inference from one thing to another, discovering relations and presuppositions.

This investigating faculty or activity of the mind does not, indeed, entirely desert the point of view of sense-perception, but it adopts by implication the view of reason. It makes activity the principle of explanation, and in this implies self-activity. But it

explains each object as derivative or dependent on its environment. The implication of self-activity contained in the idea of force, cause, or energy, is this: as we have shown, force connects unity and variety, internality and externality, being and manifestation. Now this contains the idea of origination, and struggle as it may to retain the idea of elements and composition, the understanding is obliged to admit the origination and transference of influence from one thing to another. Hence it comes to the idea of life, or the unfolding of an essential form of being in an external organism. Natural science has stopped for a while on a stage of arrested development—namely, on the idea of correlation of forces. But underneath the correlation there lies the assumption of the transmutation of each force into all the others in accordance with a definite law; and this definite law is the supreme form which is manifested in the correlation and transmutation. If each force may by its activity pass into the next force in the series of correlation, the whole series is the product of each force, and therefore not only a departure from, but a return to, each force. Moreover, the supreme persistent force is the self-activity which manifests its entire form in the distinctions of the series of special forces.

Such an entire form is what Plato called *eîdôs, idea*. It appears in living beings as species, general type, or exemplar of such general type.

The particular rose before me is an example of the class or species. Indeed, it is produced by a generic process which is manifested in the growth of the rose-bush. This particular animal, whatever it may be, exists through a generic process in which the lineaments and features of the idea, or *eîdôs*, manifest themselves. The *eîdôs* is a self-activity, and its process is life.

Nor is this idea (*eîdôs*) of Plato essentially different from what Aristotle calls by the same name, *eîdôs*. This is not mere form but formative energy, and in the seventh book of the *Metaphysics* (ch. ii), Aristotle sets forth the doctrine of the identity of formal cause (*eîdôs*) and energy (*éîrêpçia*) and their relation to real being. Energy, it must be noted, gives rise to two sorts of actuality, corresponding to what we have already called first and second forms of self-activity. Aristotle uses the word *entelechy* (*éînteléchçia*) to express this idea.

Aristotle's technique has led to much misunderstanding. His use of the terms *matter* (*ὕλη*) and *form* (*εἶδος*) as though mere correlations, and his polemic against Plato's doctrine of *Ideas* has led to the opinion that he held solely to the view of ordinary common-sense realism, and repudiated self-activity as the independent and self-existent.

But one may easily see how erroneous this is by considering his definition of matter, or material cause. For, according to Aristotle, matter is mere capacity or possibility, and it is the form that gives it actuality. The form-giving cause produces any and all manifestations in what is called *matter*. Hence any reality in matter is due to its form, and matter by itself would be pure nothing. "Nothing," in the sense that it is the *void* in which something may be created, is pretty much identical with Aristotle's *ὕλη*. But, again, any reality may be the material as regards a new impress of formative energy—the stuff for new realities. Aristotle holds, moreover, to the self-existence and absoluteness of pure energy as active reason (*νοῦς*), which he describes in the third book of his far-famed treatise *on the Soul* (chapters v, vi), as the creator of all things, and that by which all things are perceived in the passive reason. This is separated (*χωριστόν*) from the body and not correlated with the forces of nature (*ἀπαθέτος*). Its activity which he describes in the *Ethics* (Book X), and especially in the eleventh book of the *Metaphysics*, as theoretical insight, *θεωρεῖν*, is entirely perfect self-activity, and independent of all correlation, although it is related creatively to all things in the universe. This creative reason it is (he intimates in his *Psychology* iii-5) which makes possible the sense-perception, and the scientific investigation of objects in nature. The activity of *νοῦς*, or reason (called *intellectus* by the Romanic peoples), is intuitive and immediate insight such as we have into our highest categories, such as being, cause, essence, matter, quantity, and quality (whether we are able to consider those abstractly as in philosophy, or only use them concretely in sense-perception, and are entirely unaware of them as categories by themselves). For in all sense-perception there goes on a recognition of objects—an interpretation, as it were, of objects into what we already know and are familiar with, by the very nature of our minds. This view is outlined by Aristotle in his *Psychology* (iii, ch. 4,) in the passage where he calls our at-

tention to the fact that sense-perception takes or apprehends the forms of objects and not their matter.

Nutrition, or the activity of the plant-soul ( $\tauὸ\ θρεπτικὸν$ ), receives its environment into its organism as food, and converts or assimilates it by its activity, making it into vegetable cells. But in sense-perception the environment is not devoured, consumed, or added to the soul. Instead of appropriating it, the soul creates within itself by its self-activity the essential form of the object, and by this perceives it. Perception is not purely passive then, but a real and true self-activity of a higher order than nutrition. And even nutrition is a real manifestation of self-activity. For the living being, the plant, reacts on its environment and attacks and consumes it. Destroying the form that it finds, it uses it as matter and imposes a new form on it, and makes it into vegetable cells.

But sense-perception, on the occasion of the presence of the object, assumes the essential form of that object—becomes, as it were, that object; forming for itself an image of it, or a definition of it, causing, as it were, the environment which is presented in the outer court of its nerves of sense to be modelled within itself. In other words, the soul being essential form or formative principle, perceives by imitating the forms of things present in its environment. The essential particulars of form are creatively produced within the soul and recognized there by means of the categories which constitute the essential form of the mind, or which are the essential definitions of itself created by the soul as formative activity. Hence perception is essentially recognition—a translating of the environment into terms of the self.

The *creative reason* (called by the commentators since Alexander of Aphrodisias, the  $\text{Νοῦς ποιητικός}$ ) is, therefore, rightly to be deemed the power of all perception and understanding in us. It is the highest that makes possible the lowest. It is creative reason that makes possible even the inorganic world. It is the same creative reason which is in our soul that makes possible our humblest sense-perceptions. But our understanding is above sense-perception, inasmuch as it deals consciously with the elements of the definition of objects. The definition discovers and announces what features are essential to the form of the object; and the form of the object is its reality. Hence the  $\deltaιάνοια$  or discursive

understanding—and this belongs to the passive reason according to the *Psychology* of Aristotle (III, v)—which investigates objects in their relations and in their general predicates, comes to discriminate by degrees the general and eternal elements of form in the definition of objects, and acquires the ability to grasp them by themselves apart from objects. It thus comes to be able to think of space, time, substance, quantity, quality, mode, identity, difference, unity, cause, relation, potentiality, actuality, and beings, in and for themselves, and to see in them the self-activity of the soul itself—its own definition, as it were. Thus it mounts up to Reason itself, which sees directly the Form of Forms, or the Cause of all Causes, the Divine Creative Idea.

In this, as before remarked, Aristotle substantially repeats Plato. In his *Phædrus* (97 C.) Plato calls Reason the cause of the universe in time and space, and in his *Philebus* (28 C.) he poetically calls it “the king of heaven and earth.” Aristotle in his polemic against Plato’s doctrine of ideas fails to quote those passages wherein Plato makes the supreme and essential being to be pure self-related activity, incorporeal and eternal. Plato is very careful to connect with his ideas and attribute to them such activity as is involved in creation and thought. It is true that he calls this rational activity self-movement, (*Laws*, X, 894 A.), but it is only a quarrel over words to criticise this expression when its definition is laid down and the genera which it includes are mentioned and it is expressly asserted that such self-movement is incorporeal. Aristotle laid great stress on the fact that the first source of motion—*primum mobile*—is itself unmoved. In this he is right so far as spatial movement is concerned. The self-activity is a perpetual movement out of difference into identity with itself, and through difference again back to identity, and therefore remains for and by itself, and certainly does not have spatial movement or change in the sense in which these appertain to finite things.

This is sufficiently emphasized too by Plato. That Plato and Aristotle agree in this is the view taken by the Neo-Platonists from the time of Ammonios Sakkas down to Proklos. The Scholastics hold the same view.

St. Thomas Aquinas (*Summa Contra Gentiles*, Lib. I, cap. xiii) says: “There is no difference between Plato’s ‘First Self-Mover’ and Aristotle’s ‘First Unmoved’”; and, referring to Plato’s *Laws*,

Tenth book, and to Aristotle's *Physics*, Books III and VI, he continues: "According to Plato, the self-moved is not a material body. Plato takes motion in the sense of *operatio* or intellectual action. The activity of the intellect and will and the love of God are called *self-movement* by Plato." Although Aristotle in the sixth book of the *Physics* holds that movement can be predicated only of what is divisible and corporeal, and also what is potential but not wholly real (Book III), yet this does not contradict the thought of Plato, but only his use of words. Plato would make a special designation for this new and wonderful thought which he has discovered, and he designates it self-movement as though in contrast to motion through others—the species of motion which sense-perception talks about as though it were the ultimate form of things.

Aristotle invented the word *ἐνέργεια*, *energeia*, or internal activity, and he also made frequent use of *ἐντελέχεια* (*entelecheia*, or having-of-completion within itself—to paraphrase its meaning) in order to express self-existent activity. Quibbles and objections could easily be made against these expressions. The sensuous meaning of the words *ἔργον*, *τέλος*, and *ἔχω* could be defined and shown to be incompatible with spiritual significations.

For Sense, as we have seen, takes a fundamentally different view of the world from Reason. According to "common sense," quiescent being is first, and thinking activity is afterward, as a function of said being. But the Reason says that self-activity is the basis of being. Indeed this is so stated in religion. God, the creator, creates by a creative thought. Time and space and all existence subsist in the divine thought. Here existence is the result of thinking; and God's thinking, too, is the immanent cause of his existence. He eternally IS, in his thinking; and his thinking eternally sets forth his divine form (*eidos*) as Reason. Without this thinking he would be formless and a pure nothing, and there would be no creation of a world. But divine thinking is divine self-distinction, and from it flows creation.

In the tenth book of his *Ethics* (ch. vii) Aristotle expands upon the character of this divine activity—the pure energy of the formal cause and upon the human analogy to it.

"If happiness be an energy according to virtue, it is reasonable to suppose that it is according to the best virtue; and this must be the virtue

of the best part of man. Whether, then, this best part be the intellect or something else (which is thought naturally to bear rule and to govern, and to possess ideas upon honorable and divine subjects; or whether it is itself divine or the most divine of any properties which we possess), the energy of this part, according to its proper virtue, must be perfect happiness; and that this energy is contemplative has been stated. This also would seem to agree with what was said before, and with the truth: for this energy is the noblest, since the intellect is the noblest thing within us; and of subjects of knowledge, those are noblest with which the intellect is conversant. It is also most permanent, for we are better able to contemplate continuously than to do anything else continuously" (*Nic. Ethics*, X, ch. vii; Bohn's translation).

"But so far as this divine part surpasses the whole compound nature, so far does its energy surpass the energy which is according to all other virtue. If, then, the intellect be divine when compared with man, the life also, which is in obedience to that, will be divine when compared with human life. But a man ought not to entertain human thoughts, as some would advise, because he is human, nor mortal thoughts, because he is mortal, but so far as it is possible he should make himself immortal and do everything with a view to living in accordance with the best principle, for this in power and value is more excellent within him than all. Besides, this would seem to be each man's self, if it really is the ruling and the better part" (*Ibid.*).

"That perfect happiness is a kind of contemplative energy might be shown also from the following considerations: that we suppose the gods to be pre-eminently blessed and happy" (*Ethics*, Book X, ch. viii).

"The energy of the Deity as it surpasses all others in blessedness must be contemplative, and therefore of human energies that which is nearest allied to this must be the happiest. . . . Happiness must be a kind of contemplation" [*Θεωρία* is creative knowing and not passive knowing as we often mean by the word *knowledge*] (*Ibid.*).

"He who energizes according to the intellect, and pays attention to that, and has it in its best state, is likely to be most beloved by the gods; for if any regard is paid to human affairs by the gods, as it is thought there is, it is reasonable to suppose that they would take pleasure in what is the best and nearest allied to themselves; but this must be the intellect [Reason, *Noûs*]; and that they would be kind in return to those who love and honor this most, as persons who pay attention to their friends, and who act rightly and honorably" (*Ibid.*).

The form of the finite is that of relation to others. The kind of thinking which always takes up a subject as correlate of an-

other is the form of sense-perception. The senses are always addressed outwardly to the world before them—they cognize what is other to them. But the reason has attained to the cognition of the eternal form of the Absolute itself as revealed in the laws of its own thought. Reason therefore knows itself. Moreover, the discursive thinking deepens as it comes to cognize in the general categories these eternal characteristics of eternal form.

The immortal passage in which Aristotle has described this is to be found in his *Metaphysics*, eleventh book, seventh chapter. I translate from the German paraphrase of this chapter by Hegel, and include his running commentary on it:

“The thought thinks itself through participation ( $\muετάληψις$ ) in thought; it is, however, thought through contact and thinking; so that the thinking and that which is thought are the same.” Thought, since it is the unmoved which moves [causes motion], has an object, which, however, passes into activity, since its contents is also what is produced through thought and hence identical with the thinking activity. [The object of thought is first begotten in the activity of thinking, which is therefore a separation of the thought from itself as an object. Here in the thinking, therefore, that which is moved and that which moves is the same; since the substance of that which is thought is the thinking activity, that which is thought is the absolute cause which, itself unmoved, is identical with the thought which is moved by it; the separation and the relation are one and the same. The chief moment of the Aristotelian philosophy is therefore this: that the energy of thinking and the object which is thought are one and the same]; for that which apprehends what is thought and the essence, is thought. Its possession is one with its activity ( $\epsilon\piεργα δ' ἔχων$ ) [for it is a continuous energy], so that this “total of activity through which it thinks itself” “is more divine than that which the thinking reason supposes to possess that attribute”—*i. e.*, than the content of thought. Not that which is thought is the more excellent, but the energy of thinking itself; the activity of the apprehending produces that which is perceived [the total activity is more divine than one phase or moment of it, seized abstractly]. “Speculation ( $\dot{\eta} θεωρία$ ) is thus the most delightful and best. If God, now, is always in this, as we are at times” [in man this eternal thinking, which is God himself, occurs only as individual condition], “then he is admirable; if still more, then more admirable. But he is thus, Life, too, is his; for the actuality [energy] of thought is life. He, however, is activity; the activity returning

into itself is most excellent and eternal life. We say, therefore, that God is the eternal and the best living Being."

On this rock is built the final definition by which Europe and the Western world distinguishes itself from the older world, the world of the Orient. God the Supreme Being is not a formless essence—an empty entity—a transcendent to all thought and to all reflection, because such a supreme being has no existence or outward manifestation. But the true God is infinite form (infinite because self-related). He is divine Reason; and Reason is self-activity that perpetually reveals itself in distinctions and categories, in creation and in human cognition. Man has the divine destiny to partake in the divine life—being endowed with Reason as the light of all his seeing—and able, by diligent application, to purify his thinking and become familiar with those eternal thoughts of the Creator in and for themselves.

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## A GLIMPSE INTO PLATO.

BY FLORENCE JAMES WILLIAMS.

There is among us now an abiding trust in the method of attaining knowledge that we commonly call Positive or Inductive.

The great sense of certainty which it gives us is all the more remarkable and not the less secure because it is, in some minds at least, accompanied by a sense of its inadequacy, when taken alone, to account for the whole process of gaining insight into truth. This seeming paradox is being gradually satisfactorily solved by a certain *rapprochement* between the more liberal Positivists and the more widely informed Idealists. The bigots on either side, of course, stand apart from this *rapprochement*, and ignore it, or denounce it. Let them go. It is not with bigots on either side that we concern ourselves. The bigots notwithstanding to the contrary, the majority of intelligent people among us are more and more inclined to believe that there is truth on both sides; certain truth to be gained only by the methods of Positivism—a glorious impulse toward truth given only by Idealism, and without which